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I. 
introduction 
Public  interest  in  the  monthly  and  weekly  move- 
ments  of  the  money  supply’  has  intensified  since  the 
early  1970’s.  One  manifestation  of  this  interest  is 
the  extensive  coverage  of  week-to-week  and  month- 
to-month  changes  in  the  money  supply  in  the  finan- 
cial  press.  A  second  indication  is  the  intense  scrutiny 
of  each  new  weekly  or  monthly  money  supply  statistic 
by  financial  market  participants.  Indeed,  one  of  the 
major  current  rituals  in  the  markets  is  played  out 
late  every  Thursday  afternoon  as  investors  across  the 
nation  hover  around  news  wire  machines  awaiting 
the  release  of  the  latest  weekly  money  supply  figures. 
The  increased  attentidn  to  short-run  money  supply 
movements  dates  back  to  1970  when  the  Federal 
Open  Market  Committee  (FOMC),  the  Federal  Re- 
serve’s  principal  monetary  policymaking  body,  began 
to  place  greater  weight  on  achieving  specific  longer- 
run  growth  rates  for  particular  monetary  aggregates.” 
Under  the  current  strategy  of  monetary  policy,3  the 
FOMC  periodically  specifies  desired  longer-run 
growth  rates  (extending  roughly  a  year  ahead)  for 
certain  monetary  aggregates.  These  growth  objec- 
tives  are  publicly  announced  in  quarterly  testimony 
before  one  of  the  Congressional  banking  committees. 
At  its  monthly  meetings  the  FOMC  then  reviews  the 
state  of  the  economy  and  compares  the  actual  growth 
of  the  aggregates  with  their  desired  long-run  paths. 
‘There  are  several  concepts  of  the  money  supply.  and  statistical 
series  corresponding  to  each  of  these  “monetary  aggregates”  are 
published  regularly  in  the  Federcrl  Reserve  Bulletin.  This  article 
deals  exclusively  with  the  short-run  behavior  of  MI,  the  most  nar- 
rowly  inclusive  aggregate,  which  is  comprised  of  (1)  currency 
outside  the  Treasury,  Federal  Reserve  Banks,  and  vaults  of  com- 
mercial  banks;  (2)  demand  deposits  at  commercial  banks  other 
than  domestic  interbank  and  U.  S.  Government  deposits.  less  cash 
items  in  process  of  collection  and  Federal  Reserve  float;  and  (3) 
foreign  demand  balances  at  Federal  Reserve  Banks.  MI  is  the 
aggregate  most  closely  watched  by  financial  market  participants 
and  the  general  public.  Also,  much  of  the  short-run  variability  of 
the  more  broadly  defined  aggregates  (all  of  which  include  i%)  is 
due  to  the  variability  of  ML 
*This  change  in  emphasis  is  evident  in  the  evolving  language  of 
the  FOMC’s  directives  to  the  Trading  Desk  at  the  Federal  Reserve 
Bank  of  New  York.  Prior  to  1970,  the  directives  generally  instructed 
the  Desk  to  seek  a  desired  condition  in  the  money  markets  as 
indexed  by  interest  rates  or  free  reserves.  Since  1970,  in  contrast, 
most  directives  have  instructed  the  Desk  to  foster  monw  market 
and  reserve  supply  conditions  consistent  with  more  rapid,  slower, 
or  unchanged  growth  of  the  monetary  aggregates. 
*See  Lomhra  and  Torte  C41  for  a  detailed  description  of  the 
current  strategy  of  monetary  policy. 
Based,  on  this  review  the  FOMC  specifies  short-run 
“tolerance  ranges”  for  the  growth  rates  of  the  aggre- 
gates  over  the  two-month  period  covering  the  cur- 
rent  and  following  months.  The  aim  in  setting  these 
tolerance  ranges  is  to  define  the  near-term  growth 
rates  most  likely  to  be  consistent  with  achieving  the 
existing  long-run  growth  objectives.  Consistency  in 
this  context,  however,  does  not  necessarily  imply 
equality.  The  short-run  ranges  can  and  often  do 
deviate  numerically  from  the  long-run  objective 
either  because  the  FOhilC  is  attempting  to  offset 
some  unintended  deviation  in  earlier  months  or  be- 
cause  some  temporary  but  foreseeable  factor  is  es- 
petted  to  affect  short-run  growth. 
In  any  event,  once  the  short-run  tolerance  ranges 
are  set,  the  FOhlC  specifies  a  Federal  funds  rate 
range  (normally  from  50  to  100  basis  points  in 
width)  believed  to  be  consistent  with  short-run 
monetary  growth  within  the  bounds  of  the  tolerance 
ranges.  In  this  tactical  framework,  an  emerging 
deviation  of  the  actual  two-month  growth  rates  from 
the  specified  tolerance  ranges  might  lead  the  Federal 
Reserve  to  alter  the  Federal  funds  rate  (by  increas- 
ing  or  decreasing  the  supply  of  nonborrowed  reserves 
to  member  banks)  in  order  to  hold  the  growth  rates 
within  the  tolerance  ranges.  Finally-a  point  of 
considerable  importance-both  the  long-run  mone- 
tary  growth  objectives  and  the  two-month  tolerance 
ranges  are  expressed  in  terms  of  seasonally  adjusted 
annual  rates  of  growth. 
It  should  be  evident  from  this  description  of  the 
Federal  Reserve’s  operating  strategy  that  despite  the 
longer-run  time.  horizon  in  which  basic  monetary 
growth  goals  are  cast,  the  procedure  by  its  nature 
tends  to  focus  day-to-day  attention  on  short-run 
monetary  movements.  First,  from  the  standpoint  of 
the  Federal  Reserve,  the  key  tactical  operating  speci- 
fication  is  the  two-month  tolerance  range.  Setting  an 
appropriate  range  requires  close  attention  to  the 
numerous  factors  affecting  current  weekly  and 
monthly  growth  rates.  Further,  incoming  weekly 
and  monthly  data  must  be  continuously  tracked  and 
evaluated  against  the  criteria  established  by  the  toIer- 
ante  ranges.  Second,  the  procedure  naturally  stimu- 
2  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1977 lntes  financial  market  interest  in  the  short-run  be- 
havior  of  the  aggregates.  Given  this  procedure,  these 
nlovements  strongly  influence  market  expectations 
regarding  the  likelihood  that  the  Federal  Reserve 
\vill  seek  a change  in  the  Feder;~l  funds  rate  that  will 
in  turn  influence  tlie  lx-ices  and  yields  of  other  finan- 
cial  instruments.  ;is  a  I-esult.  considerable  resources 
\vitliin  the  markets  are  no\v  devoted  to  “watching” 
hot11  the  Federal  Resell-e  2nd  the  money  supply. 
Tlie  major  difficult).  that  arises  in  this  institutional 
fr:liiie\vork  is  that  short-run  monetary  data,  even 
after  seasonal  adjustment.  xe  highly  volatile.  It  is 
therefore  difficult  to  project  short-run  movements, 
even  for  the  immediate  future,  and  equally  difficult 
to  evaluate  incoming  data.  Cliart  1  illustrates  this 
volatility.  It  conilx~res  tlie  originally  published  or 
“l)reliminar~“~  seasonally  adjusted  one-  and  two- 
month  ;\I1  grokvth  rates  (at  annual  rates)  in  1975 
and  1976  \vith  the  full  year  g-ro\vth  rates  during  the 
surrounding  12-month  period.  Table  I  provides  a 
‘As  evidence  of  this  expectational  impact.  the  corwlation  coeffi- 
cient  between  the  chanse  in  MI  announced  Thursday  and  the  char.re 
in  the  three-month  Treasury  bill  rate  the  followins  day  was  26 
over  the  52  weeks  of  19i6,  which  is  statistically  significant  at  the 
5  percent  level. 
z Throughout  this  article,  “preliminary”  refers  to  the  MI  statistic 
first  published  covering  a  particular  period.  “Final”  refers  to 
the  most  recently  revised  statistic  for  a  period.  The  emphasis  will 
be  on  the  preliminary  data  since  it  is  the  preliminary  data  to  which 
both  the  Federal  Keserve  and  the  financial  markets  react. 
further  illustration.  It  shows  the  standard  deviations 
of  the  annualized  preliminary  one-  and  two-month 
l\iI,  growth  rates  in  each  of  the  last  ten  years.  The 
average  standard  deviation  is  5.5  percentage  points 
for  the  one-month  growth  rate  and  3.8  percentage 
points  for  the  two-month  growth  rate.  Strikingly, 
the  standard  deviation  of  the  one-month  growth  rates 
actually  exceeds  the  average  monthly  growth  rate  in  a 
number  of  years.  This  volatility  of  short-run  growth 
rates  relative  to  trend  would  not  constitute  a  serious 
problem  if  it  were  possible  to  distinguish,  on  a  cur- 
rent  basis,  between  transitory  changes  in  money 
growth  and  more  permanent  changes  related  to  basic 
economic  developments.  Unfortunately,  making  such 
distinctions  is  an  extremely  difficult  task.  Conse- 
quently,  the  possibility  always  exists  that  the  short- 
run  behavior  of  the  monetary  aggregates  might  mis- 
lead  either  the  Federal  Reserve  or  market  partici- 
pants  observing  and  trying  to  anticipate  Federal 
Reserve  actions. 
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  provide  some  in- 
sights  into  the  difficulties  inherent  in  interpreting  the 
short-run  behavior  of  the  seasonally  adjusted  mone- 
tary  aggregates  and  to  provide  a  framework  for 
analyzing  certain  kinds  of  short-run  swings.  The 
article  lvill  focus  on  variations  caused  by  factors 
other  than  changes  in  basic  underlying  conditions  in 
1  I  Chartl~“,  I,  d_  * 
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the  economy.  As  indicated  in  the  sections  that  follow, 
these  noneconomic  factors  are  responsible  for  a  sub 
stantial  portion  of  the  observed  illouth-to-moIltl~  and 
week-to-week  variations  in  monetary  growth  rates. 
The  next  section  of  the  article  describes  in  general 
terms  the  various  kinds  of  noneconomic  factors  that 
produce  short-run  movements  in  the  preliminary  XI, 
data.  Special  attention  is  devoted  to  movements  that 
result  from  the  nature  of  the  procedures  currently 
used  to  seasonally  adjust  the  data.  The  third  section 
illustrates  some  of  the  points  made  in  the  second 
section  with  specific  examples  of  factors  affecting 
monthly  M1  growth  rates  in  recent  years.  The 
fourth  section  provides  further  illustrations  with 
reference  to  the  weekly  M1  statistics.  The  final 
section  contains  a  brief  summary  of  the  article  and 
presents  a  few  conclusions. 
II. 
Some  Factors  Affecting  Short-Run  Movements  in 
Money  Growth  Rates:  A  General  Description 
This  section  will  discuss  in  general  terms  some  of 
the  noneconomic  factors  that  produce  variations  in 
seasonally  adjusted  short-run  Ml  growth  rates.  Ob- 
served  growth  rates  are  no  doubt  related  in  some 
way  to  changes  in  economic  conditions.  But  factors 
totally  unrelated  to  current  business  conditions  can 
cause  significant  variations  in  these  growth  rates. 
Special  nonrecurring  events  can  have  an  important 
effect  on  demand  deposit  balances  in  some  cases  over 
periods  of  several  weeks.  Moreover,  seasonal  adjust- 
ment  techniques,  despite  notable  improvemer,  ts  in 
recent  ).ears.  are  far  from  perfect.  Over  long  periods, 
variations  in  the  M1  data  related  to  both  special 
events  and  seasonal  adjustment  problems  should 
wash  out.  But  factors  such  as  these  produce  sharp 
fluctuations  in  short-run  growth  rates. 
It  will  be  useful  in  organizing  the  discussion  to 
distinguish  two  classes  of  variations  :  ( 1)  movements 
that  result  from  shortcomings  in  the  method  cur- 
rently  used  to  seasonally  adjust  the  data  and  (2) 
irregular  variations  due  to  special  nonrecurring 
events.  Each  of  these  two  categories  of  factors  will 
be  addressed  in  turn.  The  focus  throughout  this 
section  is  primarily  on  the  monthly  data. 
Variations  Due  to  Deficiencies  in  the  Seasonal 
Adjustment  Procedures  Chart  2  shows  the  an- 
nualized  monthly  growth  rates  of  ~of  seasonally  ad- 
justed  M1  in  1973,  1975,  and  1976.  It  is  evident 
from  the  chart  that  these  growth  rates  are  extremely 
variable,  ranging  from  over  3070  to  under  -3070, 
and  that  they  are  dominated  by  recurring  seasonal 
Inovenients.  A  glance  at  the  chart  suggests  two  of 
the  major  forces  underlyin,  0  this  seasonal  movement  : 
tax  dates--April,  in  particular,  \vheii  individuals  ac- 
cumulate  balances  to  pay  income  tnses-and  the  iti- 
creased  business  activity  during  the  Christnlas  season. 
As  described  in  Box  I  on  11. 5,  the  M1  data  are 
seasondly  adjusted  with  seasonal  factors  computed 
I)):  the  I<ureau  of  the  Census’  S-1  1  Variant  of  the 
Census  Metllotl  I1  Seasonal  Adjustment  Program 
(referi-etl  to  below  as  X-1  1)  Judgmental  modifica- 
tions  are  then  made  by  the  Federal  Reserve  staff  in 
\  h~~“jl  e 
,*  i-  :  ” 
;&g12”  3,;  “-  pi  s”  ,‘ 
NOT  SEASbNALLY  “ADJUSTED 
MONTHLY  M,  GROWTH  RATES  ~ 
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SEASONAL  ADJUSTMENT  OF  THE  MONEY  SUPPLY:  THE  PROBLEM  OF  MOVING  SEASONALS 
As  indicated  in  the  text,  money  supply  data  are 
seasonally  adjusted  I)y  the  Federal  Reserve  staff 
using  the  Census  Bureau’s  S-11  Variant  of  the 
Census  Method  I I  seasonal  adjustment  model,  re- 
ferred  to  belo\v  simply  as  X-11.  ITsing  unadjusted 
data  for  a  period  of  years,  this  ~notlcl  generates  a 
seasonal  adjustment  factor  for  each  entry  in  the 
series:  for  example,  for  each  individual  month  in  a 
monthly  series  of  money  stock  data.  In  deter- 
mining  the  final  seasonal  adjustment  factors  actu- 
ally  cmploycd  in  developing  the  published  season- 
ally  adjusted  money  supply  series,  the  staff  may 
alter  the  adjustment  factors  derived  from  the  model 
where  the  staff’s  knoxvledge  of  special  circum- 
stances  affecting  the  X-11  factors  suggests  such 
alterations  are  in  order.  What  follows  is  a  brief 
description  of  some  of  the  problems  encountered 
in  applying  X-11  to  money  supply  data.  (For  a 
detailed  description  and  analysis  of  Federal  Reserve 
procedures  used  in  seasonally  adjusting  the  money 
supply,  see  the  accompanying  article  I)y  Lawler.) 
Like  most  conventional  seasonal  adjustment  pro- 
cedures,  X-11  assumes  tllat  the  lcvcl  of  an  unad- 
justed  data  series  (call  it  Munad  in  the  case  of 
monthly  money  supply  data)  at  any  point  in  time 
reflects  the  combined  influence  of  four  underlying 
determinants:  long-term  trend  movements  (T), 
cyclical  movements  (C),  regularly  recurring  sea- 
sonal  movements  (S),  and  irregular  movements 
(I).  The  version  of  X-11  used  the  Federal 
serve  assumes  four  determinants  related 
to  another  in  multiplicative,  i.e., 
fashion: 
hl  =  T  c  X  2;  I. 
this  general  one  can 
two  alternative  under  xvhich 
influences  might  the  unadjusted 
supply  data:  a  condition  the  pattern 
seasonal  influences  constant  from  to  year 
(2)  a  where  the  changes  from 
year  to  next.  111  iirbt  case,  multi- 
ljlicativc  proportionate  inlpact  seasonal  influ- 
on  tlie  data  is  hame  for 
particular  calendar  (say,  January)  all  of 
years  covered  the  series.  these  condi- 
any  computed  of  seasonal 
factors,  S,  January,  February,  respectively, 
should  constant  over  full  span  years 
covered  the  series.  the  second  the  pro- 
impact  of  influences  during 
given  calendar  changes  over  To  re- 
these  changes  seasonal  adjustment 
for  each  month  should,  general, 
change  out  year  the  next. 
has  alternative  modes  designed 
deal  with  of  these  sets  of 
As  applied  any  set  monthly  data,  X-11 
model  essentially  a  average  sea- 
adjustment  procedure.  means  that 
seasonal  adjustment  are  derived  develop- 
ing  of  (1)  unadjusted  data  individual 
months  example,  June  in  the  to 
(2)  average  of  months  data  on 
that  Such  a  is  calculated  each 
individual  in  the  The  seasonal 
justment  factor  each  individual  is  then 
by  averaging  ratio  for  month 
with  ratios  for  corresponding  calendar 
in  other  The  two  modes 
mentioned  enter  the  as  follows. 
the  pattern  seasonal  influences  the  data 
believed  to  stable  over  a  single 
adjustment  factor  derived  for  of  the 
calendar  months  an  average  all  of  the 
ratios  for  that  calendar  month  over  the  full  series. 
If  the  pattern  is  believed  to  be  changing  over  time, 
a  moving  average  of  such  ratios,  covering  a  more 
abbreviated  time  span,  is  used  to  compute  a  distinct 
adjustment  factor  for  each  individual  month  in  the 
series. 
For  the  reasons  given  in  the  text,  it  is  clear  that 
the  seasonal  pattern  of  the  unadjusted  monthly 
money  supply  series  is  not  constant  but  changes 
over  time.  Therefore  the  version  of  X-11  used  to 
adjust  the  money  supply  data  derives  seasonal  ad- 
justment  factors  for  each  individual  month  in  the 
series  from  a  weighted  7-term  moving  average  of 
the  ratios  in  the  corresponding  calendar  months  of 
surrounding  years.  Where  a  month  is  in  one  of  the 
terminal  years  of  the  series,  the  span  of  the  moving 
average  is  reduced  since  data  for  a  full  centered 
7-term  moving  average  are  not  available.  For 
example,  the  presently  published  adjustment  factor 
for  January  1973  (an  example  of  what  is  called 
“final”  data  in  the  text)  is  derived  from  a  weighted 
average  of  the  January  ratios  for  the  years  1970- 
1976,  inclusive.  The  presently  published  factor  for 
January  1976  is  derived  from  the  four  year  period 
1973-1976,  inclusive. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  under  this  procedure, 
the  factors  used  to  seasonally  adjust  incoming  data 
during  the  current  year-the  all  important  “prelimi- 
nary”  data  to  which  both  the  Federal  Reserve  and 
the  markets  react-are  derived  from  ratios  of  pre- 
ceding  years  and  do  not  directly  reflect  any  changes 
in  seasonal  patterns  in  the  current  year.*  For  ex- 
ample,  the  seasonal  factor  used  to  adjust  the  Janu- 
ary  1973  figure  when  the  figure  was  initially  re- 
leased  in  early  February  1973  was  derived  from  the 
January  ratios  for  the  years  1969-1972,  inclusive. 
Therefore,  if  the  seasonal  pattern  is  in  fact  chang- 
ing  in  the  current  year,  it  is  particularly  likely  that 
the  procedure  will  distort  the  preliminary,  i.e., 
current,  data.  Ironically,  this  is  precisely  the  data 
of  greatest  importance  to  Fed  policymakers  and  the 
markets.  The  discussion  in  the  text  describes  some 
of  the  distortions  that  arise  and  shows  that  these 
distortions  are  a  source  of  seasonal  movement  in 
the  seasonally  adjusted  money  supply  data. 
*  Strictly  speaking  the  weights  attached  to  these 
preceding  year  ratios  might  implicitly  cause  the 
procedure  to  anticipate  current  year  changes  to  a 
small  extent. 
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cies.”  As  indicated  in  the  ljox,  the  purpose  of  se;l- 
sonally  adjusting  lhf ,  is  to  eliminate  the  impact  of 
seasonal  forces,  leaving  only  trend,  cycle  and  irregu- 
lar  movements.  In  practice,  however,  the  influence 
of  seasonal  forces  is  often  not  eliminated  from  tile 
preliminary  seasonally  adjusted  M,  data.  A  majoi 
reason  for  this  residual  seasonality  is that  X-l  1 neces- 
sarily  relies  solely  on  past  data  in  calculating  pre- 
liminary  seasonal  adjustment  factors  and  therefore 
cannot  take  full  account  of  changes  in  seasonal  l)e- 
havior  currently  in  progress,  despite  the  program’s 
allowance  for  “moving”  seasonnls  described  in  tile 
Box. 
A  variety  of  developments  can  change  the  relative 
impact  of  seasonal  events  on  the  money  supply  in  a 
particular  month.  First,  there  are  changes  in  the 
tiutling  of  seasonal  events.  For  example,  in  1955  the 
final  day  for  the  payment  of  nonwithheld  individual 
Federal  income  taxes  was  permanently  shifted  from 
March  15 to  April  15.  A  contrasting  example  is  the 
continuously  shifting  calendar  position  of  the  Easter 
holiday.  Second,  the  relative  magnitude  of  sctrsonnl 
force  can  change.  The  aggregate  amom7t  of  individ- 
ual  or  corporate  taxes  paid  in  a  given  month  relative 
to  the  level  of  the  money  supply,  for  instance,  might 
deviate  from  the  usual  norm.  This  deviation  might 
be  due  either  to  a  change  in  the  total  tax  liability 
relative  to  M1  or  to  a  change  in  the  distribution  of 
payments  over  the  various  periodic  tax  payment 
dates  within  the  year.  Third,  the  VUWULCY  in  which 
households  and  bzrsincss  firms  wanage  their  UIOIIE~ 
balances  during  periods  characterized  by  recurring 
seasonal  events  can  change.  For  example,  improved 
corporate  cash  management  practices  have  probabl) 
compressed  the  necessary  lead-time  for  the  accumLi- 
lation  of  cash  balances  prior  to  scheduled  tax  pay- 
ments.  Finally,  neza,  seasonal  events  appear  from 
time  to  time.  In  late  1972,  for  instance,  the  Federal 
government  initiated  sizable  revenue-sharing  pay- 
ments  at  the  beginning  of  each  quarter. 
The  impact  of  these  several  changing  seasonal 
forces  on  short-run  seasonally  adjusted  Ml  growth 
rates  is  likely  to  vary,  depending  particularly  on  (1) 
whether  the  change  is  permanent  or  temporary  and 
(2)  if  permanent,  whether  the  change  occurs  gradu- 
0 See  the  accompanying  article  by  Lawler  for  a  description  of  these 
judgmental  modifications.  In  making  these  modifications  the  staff 
faces  many  of  the  same  difficulties  anticipating  changes  in  seasonal 
patterns  encountered  by  the  X-11  proaram  itself.  For  this  reason 
it  is  not  clear  that  the  modifications  significantly  improve  the 
preliminary  data.  In  any  case,  this  article  does  not  attempt  to 
evaluate  these  modifications. 
ally  over  :I  period  of  years  or  abruptly.  Moreover, 
tile  inil)act  of  tliese  changes  on  the  preliminary  (i.e.. 
first  l)ul)lislietl)  adjusted  data  for  a  particular  month 
is  likely  to  differ  from  tlleir  impact  on  the  final 
revised  tlata  for  the  month.  The  folloning  para- 
gr~plis  will  el:J)ornte  these  points. 
Consider  first  the  final  data.  As  indicated  in  the 
hs,  S-l  1 uses  a  seven-year  weighted  nioving  aver- 
age  of  data  centered  on  a  given  year  in  deriving  final 
seasonally  adjusted  data  for  that  year.’  For  this 
reason,  the  program  is  especially  well  suited  to  ac- 
commodating,  after  the  fact,  gmdrta!  changes  in 
underlying  seasonal  patterns  since  the  centered, 
seven-year  nioving  average  by  its  very  construction 
should  capture  such  changes.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  program  is  not  particularly  well  suited  to  dealing 
with  permanent  changes  that  occur  abruptly.  As  an 
example,  assume  that  a  lasting  change  in  some  sen- 
sonal  event  affecting  M1  occurred  abruptly  in  1973. 
Here,  even  the  final  adjusted  monthly  data  for  1973 
might  not  adequately  capture  the  change  since  the 
final  data,  derived  from  the  seven-year  centered 
moving  average,  would  be  based  partly  on  experience 
during  the  years  1970,  1971,  and  1972-all  years 
preceding  the  change. 
Consider  next  the  more  significant  preliminary 
data.  Kegardless  of  whether  a  permanent  change  in 
underlying  seasonal  forces  occurs  gradually  or 
abruptly,  the  preliminary  adjusted  growth  rates  are 
likely  to  be  distorted  in  the  seiise  that  they  will 
probably  differ  systematically  from  revised  data  pub 
lished  later.  The  reason  for  these  distortions  is  that 
S-l  1  derives  preliminary  adjustment  factors  from 
actual  data  for  years  preceding  the  year  in  question. 
(See  Box.)  Consequently,  the  preliminary  factors 
fail  to  capture  the  full  effects  of  changes  in  under- 
lying  seasonal  behavior.  Such  distortions  are  ob- 
viously  significant  since  it  is  the  preliminary  adjusted 
Ml  data  that  condition  current  monetary  policy  and 
the  behavior  of  the  financial  markets. 
A  couple  of  hypothetical  examples  might  help  to 
clarify  the  nature  of  these  distortions.  Suppose  that 
begimiing  in  19S0,  the  unadjusted  growth  rates  of 
hII  in  the  month  of  October  began  to  display  a 
g~~drtnl  but  persistent  decline  due,  perhaps,  to  a 
7 The  term  “final”  may  be  slightly  misleading  in  that  money  susplr 
data  is  always  subject  to  further  revision.  The  term  is  used  hers, 
to  refer  to  revised  adjusted  data  available  beginnina  in  the  fourth 
year  following  the  year  to  which  it  applies.  Such  data  is  seasonally 
adjusted  using  adjustment  factors  that  are  derived  from  actual  data 
for  the  full  seven-year  period  covered  by  the  seven-term  movins 
average  in  the  X-11  program. 
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that  month.  Suppose  further  that  this  trend  per- 
sisted  through  the  year  1990.  Under  these  circum- 
stances,  the  X-11  seasonal  adjustment  factor  used  to 
compute  the  prelinlinary  seasonally  adjusted  growth 
rate  in,  say,  October  19S5  would  reflect  the  move- 
ment  in  M,  in  the  years  19Sl-19%.  Consequently, 
this  preliminary  factor  would  be  biased  upward  and 
the  preliminary  seasonally  adjusted  growth  rate 
\voultl  l)e  understated.X  In  subsequent  years  the 
October  19%  gro\vth  rate  \vould  be  revised  upward. 
The  preliminary  gro\vth  rates  for  Octoijer  in  ensuing 
J’ears,  ho\vever.  would  continue  to  differ  systemati- 
cally  from  revised  gro\vth  rates  as  long  as  the  trend 
continued. 
Consider  next  an  ab,-lip1  future  change  in  a  sea- 
sonal  event  such  as,  for  instance.  a  hypothetical 
change  in  the  deadline  for  iiidi~idual  Federal  income 
t;ls  l~:tyinents  from  April  15  to  May  15.  Suppose 
that  such  :I cllange  Ivent  into  effect  in  19S6.  In  that 
case,  beg-inning  in  19SG the  unadjusted  growth  of  MI 
in  April  would  be  low  \\hile  not  seasonally  adjusted 
gro\vth  in  Slay  would  be  high  relative  to  the  pattern 
in  earlier  years.  Here,  the  preliminary  seasonal  ad- 
jListment  factors  for  April  and  Llay  19SG would  be 
I)asetl  on  i\l,  I)ehavior  over  tlie  19S2-19S5  period. 
Consequently,  the  preliniinnry  adjusted  growth  rate 
for  April  19SG  would  proba1~1y  I)e  unusually  low, 
\\-bile  the  R’lny  1924  growth  rate  \vould  be  signifi- 
cantly  inflated.  In  the  absence  of  further  changes. 
however,  the  problem  would  tend  to  disappear  by 
1990  since  by  that  year  all  of  the  data  used  in  de- 
riving  the  preliminary  April  and  May  adjustment 
factors  would  reflect  the  19SG  tax  date  change. 
Beyond  the  more  durable  seasonal  developments 
discussed  to  this  point,  temporary  changes  can  also 
affect  short-run  seasonally  adjusted  monetary  growth 
rates.  As  ;L final  ex;unple,  suppose  that  Federal  tax 
payments  by  individuals  were  unusually  large  relative 
to  the  level  of  Ml  in  April  19S3,  but  that  in  19S3 
and  subsequent  years,  the  payments  fell  back  to  more 
normal  levels.  In  this  case  the  preliminary  seasonal 
adjustment  factor  for  April  19S3,  which  would  be 
based  on  1979-1932  experience,  would  be  low  relative 
to  the  level  of  the  tax  payments.  Hence,  in  the 
absence  of  some  other  ulwsual  event  tending  to  de- 
press  growth,  the  preliminary  seasonally  adjusted  RiIl 
growth  rate  for  April  19S3  would  be  relatively  high. 
Further,  the  final  revised  data  for  this  month  would 
‘The  X-11  prozram  does  contain  an  adjustment  designed  to  correct 
partially  for  trend  changes  in  seasonal  behavior.  See  r7,  p,  161. 
As  long  as  the  chanaes  continue  nt  roughly  the  same  pace.  however. 
the  correction  will  be  only  partial,  and  the  bias  discussed  in  the  text 
will  persist. 
also  show  a  relatively  high  growth  rate  under  these 
circumstances. 
It  should  be  clear  from  this  discussion  that  the 
procedure  presently  used  to  seasonally  adjust  mone- 
tary  data  is  itself  an  important  potential  source  of 
short-run  variations  in  adjusted  monetary  growth 
rates. 
Irregular  Variations  In  addition  to  the  effects 
of  changing  seasonal  patterns  working  through 
the  seasonal  adjustment  procedures,  short-run  M, 
growth  rates  are  also  strongly  influenced  at  times  by 
irregular,  nonrecurring  events.  In  contrast  to  sea- 
sonal  movements  no  effort  is  made  to  remove  such 
irregular  movements  from  the  adjusted  Ml  data. 
While  the  events  underlying  these  movements  are 
not  always  fully  understood,  in  many  instances  the 
explanation  is  straightforward.  One  of  the  best 
examples  of  a  large  irregular  movement  in  recent 
years  was  the  bulge  in  Ml  in  May  and  June  1975 
following  the  $9  billion  disbursement  of  tax  rebates 
and  supplemental  social  security  payments  by  the 
Treasury  to  the  public.!’ 
It  should  be  noted  parenthetically  that  the  dis- 
tinction  between  ( 1)  irregular  movements  and  (2) 
the  movements  discussed  above  reflecting  temporary 
changes  in  seasonal  forces  is  not  always  clear.  In 
the  preceding  section  the  example  used  to  illustrate 
temporary  seasonal  forces  was  unusually  large  indi- 
vidual  tax  payments  in  one  year.  Some  analysts 
might  prefer  to  regard  such  an  occurrence  as  an 
irregular  event.  The  criterion  adopted  in  this  article 
is  that  events  that  recur  with  some  definite  periodic- 
ity  are  seasonal  in  nature,  while  other  events  are 
irregular.  Whatever  the  distinction  in  principle,  in 
practice  both  categories  of  events  are  likely  to  pro- 
duce  short-run  movements  in  the  seasonally  adjusted 
M1  data,  As  indicated  above,  the  X-11  program  is 
unlikely  to  remove  the  effects  of  temporary  changes 
in  seasonal  patterns  from  the  seasonally  adjusted 
data,  and  irregular  movements  are  left  in  the  adjusted 
series  by  design.‘” 
The  following  section  illustrates  the  foregoing  dis- 
cussion  with  specific  empirical  examples  from  recent 
experience. 
!‘See  Breimyer  and  Wenninaer  [z]  for  empirical  evidence  on  the 
impact  of  the  rebntes  on  seasonally  adjusted  monthly  Ml  growth 
rates  in  1975. 
‘OIt  might  be  added  that  both  irregular  movements  and  movements 
due  to  temporary  changes  in  seasonal  forces  can  present  additional 
problems  if  they  are  mistakenly  treated  as  permanent  changes  in 
seasonal  patterns  by  the  X-11  pro!zram.  In  addition.  computed 
seasonal  adjustment  factors  might  be  distorted  by  cyclical  develop- 
ments.  See  Lawler  13,  p.  241  and  Poole  and  Lieberman  [6,  pp. 
325-3341. 
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Factors  Affecting  Short-Run  Money  Growth  Rates: 
Some  Empirical  Examples 
Gradual  Changes  in  Seasonal  Patterns:  The 
Christmas  Cycle  As  shown  in  Chart  2,  the  un- 
adjusted  growth  rate  of  M1  typically  rises  in  the 
months  prior  to  Christmas  and  falls  in  the  months 
following  Christmas.  This  pattern  presumably  re- 
flects  the  rising  demand  for  transactions  balances 
associated  with  increased  business  activity  prior  to 
the  holiday  and  the  reduced  need  for  such  balances 
after  the  holiday.  The  behavior  of  unadjusted  M1 
during  this  period  forms  a  regular  “Christmas  cycle” 
that  appears  to  begin  as  early  as  late  August,  peaks 
in  the  first  week  of  January,  and  reaches  a  trough  in 
Chart  3 
THE  CHRISTMAS  CYCLE 
Percentage  increase  in  Not  Seasonally 
Adjusted  M1  From  late  August  Trough 
Percent 
-  1963-65 
- .  ..-.....  ,96*.,0 
---  1973-75 
late  February.”  The  net  increase  from  the  late 
August  trough  to  the  late  February  trough  generalI> 
is  roughly  equal  to  the  trend  rate  of  iLlI1 growtll. 
Hence,  the  cycle  is complete  in  the  sense  that  the  pre- 
Christmas  seasonal  rise  has  nashed  out  by  the  end 
of  February. 
As  suggested  by  Chart  3,  the  shape  of  the  Christ- 
mas  cycle  has  undergone  :I  sulMaiitia1  and  fairI> 
continuous  change  since  the  mid-  1960’s.  despite  the 
fact  that  the  typical  percentage  rise  from  the  August 
trough  to  the  January  peak  has  been  fairly  stable.  In 
particular,  the  c).cle  has  become  narrower  to\vartls 
the  base,  so  that  ;I greater  part  of  the  pre-Christmas 
rise  now  occurs  in  the  November-December  period, 
and  a  greater  part  of  the  post-Christmas  runoff  oc- 
curs  in  January.  This  information  is  convey-ed  in  a 
different  way  in  Table  II,  which  shows  that  the  in- 
crease  in  the  percentage  of  the  post-Christmas  runoff 
occurring  in  January  has  been  remarkably  persistent 
over  the  longer  run.  Similarly,  except  for  197G,  the 
percentage  of  the  pre-Christmas  rise  occurring  in 
November  and  December  has  risen  quite  steadily. 
1’  Of  course,  other  seasonal  forces  affect  the  movement  of  unadjusted 
MI  in  this  period.  Christmas,  however,  appears  to  dominate  the 
pattern  of  the  unadjusted  data  over  these  months. 
Table  II 
THE  CHANGING  SHAPE  OF  THE  CHRISTMAS  CYCLE 
%  of  Rise  % of  Decline 
in  NSA  ,441  in  NSA  Ml 
Occurring  in  Occurring  in 
Nov.-Dec.  Jan. 
1961  50.5 
1962  51.3 
1963  47.5 
1964  48.8 
1965  50.1 
1966  61.9 
1967  62.9 
1968  67.5 
1969  73.1 
1970  71.6 
1971  70.5 
1972  71.7 
1973  75.2 
1974  77.6 
1975  90.8 
1976  62.7 
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SUCCESSIVE  REVISIONS  OF  JANUARY 
Ml  GROWTH  RATES 
(SAAR) 
Published  Growth  Rates  for 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  --I_----- 
As  of: 
1970  9.0 
1971  9.4  1.1 
1972  9.2  2.8  3.7 
1973  10.3  2.7  1 .o  0.0 
1974  10.4  3.3  1.5  4.7  -3.1 
1975  10.9  4.3  3.1  5.2  -2.7  -9.3 
1976  9.2  5.5  8.2  9.4  3.5  -5.1  1.2 
1977  9.2  5.5  9.2  10.3  4.4  -4.2  2.0  5.4 
Cumulative 
Revision 
+.2  +4.4  +5.5  +10.3  +7.5  +5.1  +  .a 
Note:  Diagonal  shows  preliminary  growth  rates  for  each  yeor. 
Source:  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin. 
The  gradual  change  in  the  shape  of  the  Christmas 
cycle  since  the  mid-1960’s  has  probably  been  due  at 
least  in  part  to  the  steady  rise  in  interest  rates  during 
this  period.  As  Table  11  indicates,  the  cycle  began 
to  change  in  1966,  the  year  interest  rates  began  their 
strong  upward  trend.  The  underlying  logic  here  is 
straightforward.  Higher  interest  rates  have  made  it 
progressively  more  costly  for  business  firms  and 
households  to  hold  Mt  balances  rather  than  alrertia- 
tive,  interest-bearing  assets.  Hence,  the  buildup  in 
Mt  balances  prior  to  Christmas  has  been  progres- 
sively  delayed.  Further,  after  Christmas  the  public 
has  attempted  to  convert  the  Mt  balances  acquired 
during  the  holiday  period  into  interest-earning  assets 
with  greater  speed.  These  efforts  to  economize  on 
M1  balances  have  probably  been  aided  by  the  pro- 
liferation  of  credit  cards  and  a variety  of other  finan- 
cial  instruments  permitting  improved  cash  balance 
management. 
Whatever  the  cause,  the  gradually  changing  shape 
of  the  Christmas  cycle  has  had  a  large  impact  on  the 
seasonal  adjustment  factors  for  some  of  the  Christ- 
mas  cycle  months.  First,  the  final  revised  factors  for 
these  months  have  changed  continuously  from  one 
year  to  the  next  since  the  mid-1960’s.  For  example, 
the  January  factor  has  declined  steadily  since  1965. 
More  importantly,  the  preliminary  factors  and  the 
preliminary  adjusted  growth  rates  for  these  months 
in  recent  years  have  been  substantially  revised  with 
the  passage  of  time.  Consequently,  the  preliminary 
reported  growth  rates  for  these  months  have  been 
nofably  unreliable  during  the  last  several  years.  This 
is  illustrated  in  Table  III  which  compares  the  pre- 
liminary  January  seasonally  adjusted  growth  rates 
with  successive  revisions.  The  cumulative  revisions 
have  been  very  large,  frequently  increasing  the  Janu- 
ary  growth  rates  by  more  than  5  percentage  points 
and  in  one  case  by  more  than  10  percentage  points. 
While  a  small  part  of  these  revisions  might  be  un- 
related  to  seasonal  adjustment,  it  is  clear  that  the 
preponderant  share  are  due  to  revisions  in  the  sea- 
sonal  adjustment  factors.  The  direction  of  the  Janu- 
ary  revisions  is consistent  with  the  changing  shape  of 
the  Christtnas  cycle.  As  data  for  succeeding  years 
becomes  available,  the  progressively  more  rapid  de- 
cline  in  M1  following  the  early  January  peak  pro- 
duces  a lower  January  adjustment  factor  and  a higher 
adjusted  January  growth  rate.l’ 
Abrupt  Changes  in  Seasonal  Patterns:  The  Rise 
in  Federal  Income  Tax  Refunds  Due  to  heavy 
overwithholding  of  Federal  income  taxes,  the  Trea- 
sury  typically  pays  out  sizable  tax  refunds  to  indi- 
viduals  during  the  first  half  of  the  year,  primarily  in 
the  period  from  March  through  May.  Since  a  large 
portion  of  these  funds  are  initially  deposited  in  de- 
mand  deposits,  they  affect  the  level  and  growth  rate 
of  not  seasonally  adjusted  Ml.  For  several  years 
prior  to  1973,  the  time  profile  of  these  disbursements 
was  relatively  stable,  as  was  the  total  amount  relative 
to  the  outstanding  money  supply.  Consequently,  the 
seasonal  impact  of  the  refunds  on  Mt  was  probably 
adequately  captured  by  the  X-l  1 seasonal  adjustment 
factors. 
“Another  example  of  a  long-run  trend  in  a  seasonal  force  that 
had  a  large  impact  on  a  monthly  seasonal  factor  was  the  rapid 
growth  in  nonwithheld  individual  income  taxes  paid  in  April. 
relative  to  the  money  supply,  between  the  mid-1950’s  and  the  mid- 
1960’s.  This  growth  in  tax  payments  caused  a  steady  rise  in  not 
seasonallr  adjusted  April  M1,  resulting  in  gradual  progressive 
increases  in  the  April  adjustment  factor.  See  Lawler  13.  p.  261. 
Table  IV 
INDIVIDUAL  INCOME  TAX  REFUNDS 
As  Q  Percent  of  Ml 
1968  4.9  1973  8.4 
1969  4.9  1974  8.5 
1970  6.2  1975  9.0 
1971  6.4  1976  9.0 
1972  5.9  1977  9.0 
Note:  Ratios  we  total  tax  refunds  for  the  year  divided  by  not 
seasonally  adjusted  level  of  Ml  in  December  of  the  preceding 
year.  The  figure  for  1977  is  an  estimate. 
Source:  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin. 
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In  1972,  however,  increased  withholding  for  nu- 
merous  individual  taxpayers  went  into  effect,  causing 
a  sharp  increase  in  refunds  from  $14  billion  in  1972 
to  $22  billion  in  1973.  As  indicated  in  Table  IV,  the 
result  was  an  abrupt  jump  in  total  refunds  from  about 
6 percent  of  M,  to  roughly  8%  percent  of  M,.  Chart 
4  shows  the  monthly  profile  of  the  tax  refunds  rela- 
tive  to  MI  in  the  years  following  1972  compared  to 
the  pattern  in  the  1970-72  period.  The  monthly 
profile  of  the  disbursements  was  very  similar  (1)  in 
the  years  1973,  1974,  and  1975  and  (2)  in  1976  and 
1977.  Consequently,  these  two  sets  of  years  are 
grouped  together  in  Chart  4. 
Presumably,  the  abrupt  increase  in  the  level  of 
refunds  in  1973  altered  seasonal  patterns  as  between 
the  1970-1972  period  on  the  one  hand  and  the  post- 
1972  period  on  the  other.  Specifically,  the  seasonal 
growth  of  not  seasonally  adjusted  Ml  in  the  March- 
June  period  has  probably  been  stronger  in  the  latter 
years.13  On  the  basis  of  the  discussion  of  the  X-11 
model  in  the  preceding  section  of  this  article,  one 
might  expect  this  shift  to  distort  the  preliminary  sea- 
sonally  adjusted  M,  growth  rate  over  the  March-June 
period  in  1973,  since  this  growth  rate  was  calculated 
using  seasonal  adjustment  factors  based  on  data 
through  1972  only.  More  specifically,  one  would  ex- 
pect  X-11  to  produce  an  upward  bias  in  the  prelimi- 
nary  growth  rate  over  this  period  in  1973,  leading  to 
downward  revisions  as  additional  high  refund  years 
were  use  to  calculate  the  1973  seasonal  adjustment 
factors.14  (As  suggested  in  Section  II,  however,  even 
the  final  adjusted  1973  data  might  reflect  the  abrupt 
surge  in  refunds  to  some  extent  since  the  final  adjust- 
ment  factors  are  based  partly  on  pre-1973,  low-refund 
year  experience.)  The  same  general  process  should 
affect  the  1974  and  1975  data. 
In  fact,  the  preliminary  growth  rates  over  the 
March-June  period  in  the  years  1973,  1974,  and  1975 
have  been  significantly  reduced  by  subsequent  re-. 
visions.  Annualized,  seasonally  adjusted  M,  growth 
from  a  base  comprising  the  average  of  the  Januar) 
and  February  figures  to  a  terminal  value  comprising 
the  average  of  the  four  months  March  through  June 
has  been  revised  downward  on  average  by  2.49  per- 
centage  points  for  these  years,  a  fairly  dramatic  indi- 
cation  of  the  magnitude  of  &I1  revisions  that  ca!n 
occur.  It  shows  that  the  average  revision  of  the  Ml 
growth  rate  over  this  period  was  in  the  neighborhood 
of  the  typical  2  to  2yz  percentage  point  range  be- 
tween  the  upper  and  lower  limits  of  the  FOMC’s 
longer-run  Ml  growth  targets. 
The  precise  implications  of  these  downward  re- 
visions,  however,  is  clouded  by  the  fact  that  they 
might  have  been  influenced  by  benchmark  revisions 
and  by  ad  lzoc  judgmental  adjustments  made  by  the 
1J June  is  included,  even  thouph  the  bulk  of  the  refunds  are  paid 
before  June,  for  two  reasons.  First,  there  is  normally  a  lag  between 
the  receipt  of  refunds  and  their  expenditure  or  conversion  to  Other 
financial  assets.  Consequently,  the  daily  average  level  of  MI  bal- 
ances  in  June  is  likely  to  be  affected  by  refund  disbursements  in 
May.  Second,  refund  checks  mailed  in  May  (the  refund  data  are 
reported  on  a  mailing  date  basis)  may  not  actually  be  cashed  until 
JUWZ. 
14 Note  that  the  increase  in  the  level  of  refunds  tends  to  increase  the 
daily  average  level  of  not  seasonally  adjusted  Ml  in  each  of  the  fsxxr 
months  of  the  March-June  period.  Therefore,  the  impact  of  the 
refunds  on  any  individual  month’s  growth  rate  depends  on  the 
profile  of  the  refund  flow.  The  discussion  in  the  text  refers  to 
growth  over  the  entire  March-June  period:  i.e.,  the  increase  in  the 
daily  average  level  of  Mt  for  the  four-month  March-June  pwiod 
over  the  average  daily  level  for  some  base  period. 
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in  the  underlying  zX-l 1  seasonal  adjustment  factors. 
In  order  to  abstract  from  these  other  factors,  com- 
parable  growth  rates  were  calculated  using  the  factors 
generated  by  the  X-l  1  model  without  any  modifica- 
tion.  First,  unmodified  X-l  1  seasonal  adjustment 
factors  were  calculated  using  data  through  1972,  and 
these  factors  were  then  used  to  develop  a  “prelimi- 
nary”  growth  rate  for  the  March-June  1973  period 
(over  a  January-February  1973  base).  Preliminary 
March-June  growth  rates  for  1974  and  1975  were 
derived  in  a  similar  manner.  These  preliminary 
growth  rates  were  then  compared  to  “final”  growth 
rates  for  the  same  periods  derived  from  unmodified 
X-11  factors  computed  using  data  through  1976. 
The  implied  revisions  are  -1.70  percentage  points 
in  1973,  -1.56  percentage  points  in  1974,  and  -1.06 
percentage  points  in  1975-an  average  revision  of 
-1.44  percentage  points.  This  analysis  suggests  that 
successive  changes  in  the  underlying  X-11  factors 
contributed  heavily  to  the  revision  in  the  published 
M1  data  summarized  in  the  preceding  paragraph.‘” 
To  this  point  the  discussion  has  centered  on  the 
impact  of  the  increased  tax  refunds  on  the  prelimi- 
nary  seasonally  adjusted  M,  data  over  the  March- 
June  period.  More  broadly,  there  is  evidence  that  the 
increased  refunds  in  conjunction  with  the  X-l  1 model 
generally  biased  the  preliminary  seasonally  adjusted 
growth  rates  upward  in  the  second  quarter  and  down- 
ward  in  the  third  quarter  in  1973  and  subsequent 
years.  Chart  5  shows  the  week-to-week  movements 
of  a  ratio  of  three-month  Ml  growth  to  longer-run 
trend  growth  on  both  a  (preliminary)  seasonally  ad- 
justed  basis  and  an  unadjusted  basis.  The  upper 
panel  of  the  chart  shows  the  movements  in  1972,  just 
prior  to  the  abrupt  increase  in  the  refunds.  The  lower 
panel  shows  the  movements  in  1973,  just  after  the 
increase  in  the  refunds.  If  the  increased  refunds  to- 
gether  with  the  X-l  1 model  have  in  fact  produced  the 
biases  mentioned  above,  one  would  expect  a  greater 
degree  of  (in  this  particular  case  positive)  correlation 
between  the  unadjusted  and  adjusted  movements  of 
the  ratio  in  1973  than  in  1972.  The  chart  indicates 
rather  clearly  that  the  correlation  is  indeed  consider- 
ably  greater  in  1973  than  in  1972.  Specifically,  the 
correlation  coefficient  is  .70  in  1973  compared  to 
-.22  in  1972. 
‘6It  is  possible  that  these  results  are  influenced  to some  extent  by 
the  June  1975  tax  rebate  payments.  Excluding  June  from  the 
analysis.  however,  does  not  greatly  alter  the  results. 
Temporary  Changes  in  Seasonal  Patterns  In 
addition  to  relatively  durable  changes  in  seasonal 
patterns,  temporary  changes  in  the  timing  and  rela- 
tive  magnitude  of  seasonal  forces  can  also  affect 
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X-11  attempts  to  take  account  of  lasting  changes  in 
the  profile  of  seasonal  forces  influencing  M,  through 
the  construction  of  moving  adjustment  factors,  the 
model  is  simply  not  designed  to  deal  effectively  with 
temporary  changes  in  these  forces.  Basically,  the 
model  treats  such  changes  as  though  they  were  ir- 
regular  movements  in  the  not  seasonally  adjusted 
data.  Consequently,  most  of  their  impact  is  probably 
passed  on  to  the  seasonally  adjusted  data.  For 
example,  since  there  is  a  positive  relationship  be- 
tween  the  relative  magnitude  of  April  tax  payments 
and  the  unadjusted  lMl  growth  rate  in  April,  unusu- 
ally  large  April  tax  payments  in  a  given  year  prob- 
ably  tend  to  inflate  the  seasonally  adjusted  April  M1 
growth  rate  in  that  year. 
A  somewhat  more  esoteric  example  involves  the 
timing  of  April  tax  collections  by  the  Treasury. 
Individuals  generally  pay  nonwithheld  income  taxes 
by  check.  Many  of  these  checks  are  mailed  close  to 
the  April  15 deadline.  Individuals  typically  accumu- 
late  the  balances  needed  to  cover  these  checks  at  the 
time  they  are  mailed,  but  the  Treasury  often  takes 
two  or  three  weeks  to  process  the  checks.  Because  of 
the  huge  sums  involved,  even  a  small  variation  in 
processing  time  can  significantly  affect  average  daily 
M1  balances  in  April  and  seasonally  adjusted  April 
M,  growth  rates.‘? 
A  final  example  is  a  recent  change  in  the  proce- 
dures  surrounding  monthly  social  security  retirement 
and  survivors  benefit  (SSA)  disbursements.  Prior 
to  mid-1976  all  of  these  disbursements  were  made  bj 
check.  The  checks  were  usually  posted  so  that  they 
would  reach  .their  recipients  on  the  third  of  the 
month.  When  the  third  fell  on  a  Saturday,  payment 
was  made  on  that  day  even  though  some  financial 
institutions  are  closed  on  Saturdays.  If  the  third  fell 
on  a  Sunday,  payment  was  made  on  the  preceding 
Saturday.  In  mid-1976  this  schedule  was  changed 
in  conjunction  with  the  introduction  of  facilities  per- 
mitting  the  direct  deposit  of  some  of  these  clisburse- 
ments  through  electronic  media.  Specifically,  pay- 
ments  are  now  made  on  the  preceding  Friday  when 
the  third  falls  on  either  a  Saturday  or  a  Sunday.‘8 
Since  a  sizable  portion  of  the  disbursements  are  con- 
verted  into  -R/I1 balances,  these  changes  in  payment 
In As  indicated  in  Section  II  of  this  article.  the  distinction  between 
(1)  temporary  changes  in  seasonal  patterns  and  (2)  irregular 
movements  in  not  seasonally  adjusted  data  is  not  always  clear. 
Consequently.  the  choice  of  examples  in  this  and  the  following  sub- 
sections  is  somewhat  arbitrary. 
17 See  Auerbach  [ 11. 
lRThese  changes  apply  not  only  to  direct  deposits  but  also  to  pay- 
ments  by  check,  which  continue  to  account  for  well  over  half  of 
total  payment  volume. 
schedules  have  altered  the  seasonal  behavior  of  not 
seasonally  adjusted  M,  in  these  months  for  two 
reasons.  First,  the  timing  of  the  payments  with 
respect  to  calendar  dates  has  changed  compared  to 
earlier  years.  Second,  since  the  payments  are  no\\ 
made  prior  to  rather  than  after  a  holiday  or  a  week- 
end,  the  funds  are  likely  to  be  held  in  the  form  of  Ai, 
balances  for  a  longer  period  (specifically  the  one  or 
two  days  of  the  holiday  or  weekend)  before  being 
spent  or  converted  into  other  financial  assets,  thereby 
raising  average  daily  balances  and  growth  rates. 
Again,  to  the  extent  that  these  changes  are  ignored 
by  seasonal  adjustment  procedures,  they  are  likely 
to  affect  seasonally  adjusted  M,  growth  rates.‘” 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  all  of  the  conditions 
described  in  these  examples  were  present  in  April 
1977  when  RI1 grew  at  a  record  annual  rate  of  19.7 
percent.  First,  individual  nonwithheld  ta% payments 
were  larger  relative  to  the  level  of  M,  than  in  any 
other  year  since  the  Treasury  began  publishing  these 
data  in  1954.  Second,  Treasury  processing  of  these 
payments  appears  to  have  been  considerably  slower 
than  in  the  three  preceding  years  perhaps  due  to  the 
magnitude  of  the  pnyn~ents.2n  Third,  April  3  fell  on 
a  Sunday  so  that  social  security  payments  were  made 
on  Friday,  April  1.  Finally,  April  tas  refunds  were 
unusually  high,  as  shown  earlier  in  Chart  4.  These 
observations  are  not  intended  to  imply  that  these 
factors  explain  all  or  even  most  of  the  unusually 
large  prelitninary  April  1977  M1  growth  rate.  They 
do  illustrate,  however,  how  temporary  changes  in 
seasonal  forces  can  cloud  the  meaning  of  a  specific 
preliminary  monthly  M,  growth  rate. 
Irregular  Movements  in  M,  The  factors  con- 
tributing  to  short-run  variations  in  seasonally  ad- 
justed  Mt  growth  rates  discussed  thus  far  have  all 
been  related  to  changes  in  the  underlying  determi- 
nants  of  the  seasonal  behavior  of  M1.  Irregular 
movements  in  seasonally  adjusted  growth  rates,  in 
contrast,  result  from  special  or  unusual  events.  Some-- 
times  these  events  can  be  identified  and  anticipated. 
More  often,  unfortunately,  they  are  neither  identifi- 
“~The  third  has  fallen  on  a  nonbusiness  day  three  times  since  the 
schedule  chance  went  into  effect:  October  1976.  April  1977.  and 
July  19’77.  The  preliminary  seasonally  adjusted  Mi  growth  rates 
(at  annual  rates)  for  these  months  were  13.7  percent.  19.7  percent. 
and  18.3  percent,  respectively.  These  growth  rates  exceeded  both 
trend  growth  and  other  monthly  rrowth  rates  during  the  post- 
chance  period  by  wide  margins.  It  is  likely  that  the  change  con- 
tributed  to  these  hiah  prowth  rates.  although  the  extent  of  the 
effect  cannot  be  specified  precisely. 
~1 This  statement  is  based  on  a  comparison  of  tax  collections  in 
April  and  in  early  May,  respectively,  using  data  published  in  the 
Trcasur?/  Zlullet,n.  (The  collection  date  is  the  date  on  which  the 
Treasury  actually  clears  a  check.)  This  comparison  indicated  that  a 
significantly  higher  proportion  of  total  collections  in  1977  occurred 
in  May  as  opposed  to  April  than  in  the  three  preceding  years, 
strongly  suggesting  slower  processing  in  1977. 
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seasonally  adjusted  M 1 growth  rates  due  to  irregular 
events  resemble  variations  resulting-  from  changes  in 
seasonal  forces  in  that  they  complicate  the  conduct  of 
monetary  policy  IJ~  making  it  difficult  to  distinguish 
fundamental  changes  in  the  trend  or  cyclical  growth 
rate  of  Ml  from  some  transitory  change. 
As  suggested  above,  the  most  obvious  recent 
change  in  M1  growth  caused  by  an  irregular  event 
was  the  sharp  acceleration  in  May  and  June  1975 
due  to  the  $9  billion  of  tax  reljates  and  supplemental 
social  security  benefits  paid  during  those  months.  In 
hindsight,  it  seems  clear  that  while  the  FOMC  ex- 
pected  these  payments  to  enlarge  growth  rates  over 
this  period,  the  full  magnitude  of  the  impact  was  not 
anticipated.  As  a  result,  the  FOMC  appears  to  have 
concluded  that  the  acceleration  was  attributable  to  a 
considerable  extent  to  the  expansion  of  business  ac- 
tivity  just  beginning  to  gather  steam  at  that  time  and 
put  upward  pressure  on  the  Federal  funds  rate  in 
order  to  restrain  it.  The  R/I1 growth  rate  dropped 
abruptly  in  July,  however,  and  remained  minimal  for 
several  months,  prompting  the  Committee  to  reduce 
the  funds  rate  to  its  pre-rebate  level  in  October  and 
November.” 
A  number  of  other  recent  swings  in  short-run  sea- 
sonally  adjusted  M,  growth  rates  can  be  linked  to 
specific  nonrecurring  events.  For  example,  the  -3.2 
percent  rate  of  decline  in  December  1975  almost  cer- 
tainly  resulted  partly  from  the  change  in  Federal  Re- 
serve  Regulations  Q  and  D  permitting  business  firms 
to  hold  savings  deposits.  But  while  it  is  often  possible 
to  evaluate  irregular  variations  in  Ml  growth  in 
terms  of  specific  events  sucli  as  these  after  the  fact, 
it  is  extremely  difficult  in  most  cases  to  specify  the 
probable  impacts  on  short-run  growth  rates  in  ad- 
vance  with  any  degree  of  quantitative  precision. 
Obviously  the  absence  of  suc11  information  makes  the 
:‘I The  policy  record  for  the  FOMC  meeting  held  May  20.  1975.  refers 
explicitly  to  the  Committee’s  recoanition  that  short-run  MI  tolerance 
ranges  in  the  May-June  period  should  be  relatively  liberal  to  allow 
for  the  rebate  effect.  The  ran&~  was  set  at  1  to  9%  percent.  The 
actual  (preliminary)  growth  rate  for  the  two-month  period  was  14.4 
percent.  See  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System, 
Annual  Report.  1975.  P.  197.  This  episode  was  later  reviewed  by 
Chairman  Arthur  Burns  of  the  Federal  Reserve  in  testimony  before 
the  Senate  lludget  Committee  March,  1977: 
“As  events  actually  unfolded  in  May  and  June  of  1975,  the  rise 
that  took  place  in  the  money  supply  was  much  larger  than  the 
Federal  Reserve  staff  had  estimated  would  occur  as  a  result  of 
the  rebate  program.  The  inference  we  drew  was  that  the 
demand  for  money  was  expanding  rapidly  quite  apart  from  the 
rebate  program.  We  therefore  took  mildly  restrictive  action 
toward  the  end  of  June  to  reassure  the  Nation  that  the  Federal 
Reserve  would  not  countenance  monetary  expansion  on  a  sca:e 
that  might  release  a  new  wave  of  inflation.  Differences  of 
judgment  existed  then-and  still  do-as  to  the  appropriateness 
of  that  mild  tightening  action.  Let  me  say  only  that  if  we 
erred.  the  mistake  was  technical  in  origin-that  is,  it  grew 
out  of  the  difficulty  in  making  good  estimates  of  the  tax-rebate 
impact  on  deposit  growth.  In  any  event,  monetary  growth 
rates  soon  moderated,  and  we  lost  very  little  time  in  returning 
to  an  easier  monetary  stance.” 
proper  monetary  policy  response  problematic  even 
when  the  event  is  anticipated. 
IV. 
The  Weekly  Data 
Up  to  this  point  this  article  has  focused  on  short- 
run  movements  in  the  ~zonthly  M,  growth  rates.  The 
Federal  Reserve  also  publishes  seasonally  adjusted 
weekly  Ml  data.  These  data  take  the  form  of  daily 
average  balances  over  Federal  Reserve  “statement” 
weeks,  which  run  from  Thursday  through  Wednes- 
day,  inclusive.  This  section  will  extend  the  preceding 
discussion  by  describing  some  of  the  factors  that 
influence  the  weekly  behavior  of  M1. 
The  first  point  that  needs  to  be  made  about  the 
weekly  M,  data  is  that  they  are  exceedingly  volatile: 
the  change  in  Ml  this  week-whether  measured  in 
dollars  or  as  a  percentage  growth  rate-is  likely  to 
be  very  different  from  the  change  next  week.  Chart 
6  provides  a  visual  demonstration  of  this  point  using 
preiiminary  1976  data.  Each  point  on  the  graph 
shows  the  ratio  of  the  dollar  change  in  seasonally  ad- 
justed  M,  during  a  given  week  to  a  moving  53-week 
average  of weekly  changes  centered  on  that  week.  As 
the  chart  indicates,  there  are  both  wide  variations  in 
weekly  growth  over  the  year  as  a  whole  and,  in 
many  instances,  sharp  fluctuations  from  one  week 
to  the  next. 
Chart  6  suggests  that  there  is  little  if  any  system- 
atic  relationship  between  weekly  changes  in  the  level 
of  Ml-viewed  either  individually  or  over  a  period 
of  several  weeks-and  longer-run  trends  in  the  rate 
of  M1  growth.  Nonetheless,  as  pointed  out  in  the 
introduction  to  this  article,  the  FOMC’s  current 
procedures  for  implementing  monetary  policy  tend 
to  focus  the  attention  of  both  policymakers  and  finan- 
cial  market  participants  on  the  weekly  data.  Apart 
from  these  procedures,  though,  the  simple  fact  that 
the  most  recent  weekly  M1  figure  is  usually  the  latest 
information  available  regarding  monetary  develop- 
ments  quite  naturally  stimulates  interest.  The  re- 
mainder  of  this  section  attempts  to  provide  some 
perspective  for  evaluating  the  informational  content 
of  the  weekly  statistics.  In  general,  the  same  kinds 
of  factors  that  produce  variations  in  the  seasonally 
adjusted  monthly  R/I1 data  also  produce  variations  in 
the  seasonally  adjusted  weekly  MI  data.  Abstracting 
again  from  fundamental  changes  in  underlying  eco- 
nomic  conditions,  these  factors  are  :  (1)  irregular 
events  and  (2)  changes  in  the  timing  and  magnitude 
of  seasonal  movements  not  captured  by  the  seasonal 
adjustment  factors  used  to  adjust  the  data. 
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Box  II 
SEASONAL  ADJUSTMENT  OF  THE  WEEKLY  Ml  DATA 
The  technique  used  to  seasonally  adjust  the 
weekly  Ml  data  is  essentially  an  extension  of  the 
procedure  used  to  develop  monthly  seasonal  adjust- 
ment  factors.  Indeed,  the  weekly  adjustment  fac- 
tors  arc  derived  directly  from  the  seasonally  ad- 
justed  monthly  data  as  follows.  First,  the  adjusted 
monthly  data  are  centered  at  mid-month,  and  a 
provisional  seasonally  adjusted  level  for  each  state- 
ment  week*  is  derived  by  interpolation  of  the 
monthly  series.  Second,  so-called  “original”  ratios 
of  the  unadjusted  weekly  data  to  the  provisional 
adjusted  weekly  data  are  derived  for  each  state- 
ment  week,  and,  through  interpolation  of  these 
statement  week  ratios,  “offset”  ratios  are  derived 
for  weeks  ending  on  days  other  than  a  Wednesday. 
Following  these  calculations,  a  ratio  exists  for  each 
individual  day  in  the  entire  data  series,  covering  the 
calendar  week  ending  on  that  day.  Third,  a 
weighted  moving  five-year  average  of  these  ratios 
is  calculated  for  each  statement  week  in  the  series. 
This  calculation  uses  the  ratio  for  the  statement 
week  in  question  along  with  the  “original”  or, 
*  Statement  weeks  are  Federal  Reserve  reporting 
weeks  running  from  Thursday  through  the  fol- 
lowing  Wednesday. 
where  necessary,  the  “offset,”  ratios  for  corre- 
sponding  calendar  weeks  in  the  four  surrounding 
years,  with  truncation  of  the  average  for  terminal 
years  in  tile  series.  For  example,  the  weighted 
average  used  in  calculating  the  currently  published 
factor  for  the  statement  week  ending  March  7, 
1973,  is  based  on  the  ratios  for  the  calendar  weeks 
ending  h,Iarch  7  in  the  years  1971.1975,  inclusive. 
The  average  used  in  calculating  the  currently  pub- 
lished  factor  for  the  statement  week  ending 
March  3,  1976,  is  Ijased  on  the  ratios  for  corre- 
sponding  \veeks  in  the  years  19741976.  inclusive.) 
This  third  step  is  designed  to  take  account  of 
moving  weekly  seasonality  and  resembles  the  pro- 
cedure  used  to  take  account  of  moving  seasonalit) 
in  the  derivation  of  the  monthly  factors.  (See 
Box  I  on  p.  5.)  Fourth,  the  average  of  the  weekly 
ratios  for  a  given  calendar  month  is  adjusted  to 
approximate  closely  the  corresponding  monthly 
seasonal  adjustment  factor.  Fifth,  these  ratios  are 
judgmentally  adjusted  by  the  Federal  Reserve  staff. 
It  should  be  clear  even  from  this  brief  summary 
that  the  weekly  seasonal  adjustment  factors  are 
subject  to  the  same  kinds  of  limitations  as  the 
monthly  adjustment  factors  and  for  roughly  the 
same  reasons. 
J 
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events  can  have  a  sizable  effect  on  monthly  M1 
growth  rates.  They  can  also  have  a  marked  impact 
on  the  weekly  data,  particularly  if  the  event  is  of 
relatively  short  duration.  Two  illustrations  from 
recent  experience  are  relevant.  In  late  January  1977, 
the  eastern  and  midwestern  portions  of  the  United 
States  experienced  the  most  severe  winter  weather  in 
several  decades,  disrupting  production  and  sales  ac- 
tivity  in  these  areas.  Seasonally  adjusted  M,  fell  a 
total  of  $3.0  billion  over  the  two  statement  weeks 
ending  January  26,  compared  to  declines  of  only 
$100  million  and  $700  million  in  the  corresponding 
periods  in  1976  and  1975,  respectively.  It  is  likely 
that  the  unusual  weather  was  partly  responsible. 
R4ore  recently,  there  was  a  precipitous  $5.0  billion 
increase  during  the  statement  week  ending  July  20, 
1977.  The  magnitude  of  the  rise  contrasted  sharply 
with  the  moderate  growth  typical  of  mid-July.  While 
the  full  explanation  for  this  increase  is  unclear,  the 
July  13  power  failure  in  New  York  City,  which  dis- 
rupted  interbank  settlements  there,  may  have  been  a 
contributing  factor.  While  it  is  sometimes  possible 
to  anticipate  irregular  events  such  as  these,  they  are 
more  often  not  anticipated,  leading  in  some  instances 
to  substantial  market  reactions. 
Changes  in  the  Magnitude  and  Timing  of  Sea- 
sonal  Gains  As  in  the  case  of  the  monthly  data, 
short-run  swings  in  the  adjusted  kveekly  data  are  also 
caused  by  changes  in  the  magnitude  and  timing  of 
seasonal  movements  not  captured  by  the  seasonal 
adjustment  factors.  “Distortions”  of  the  adjusted 
weekly  data  of  this  sort  result  from  inherent  defi- 
ciencies  in  the  procedures  used  to  derive  weekly 
seasonal  adjustment  factors  similar  to  those  discussed 
in  Section  II  of  this  article  with  respect  to  the  deri- 
vation  of  the  monthly  adjustment  factors.  (The  pro- 
cedure  for  seasonally  adjusting  the  weekly  h4,  data 
is  outlined  briefly  in  Box  II  on  11. 14.)  There  is 
evidence  that  the  distortion  of  the  preliminary  ad- 
justed  weekly  data  clue  to  these  deficiencies  is  siz- 
able.  The  results  of  one  recent  study  suggest  that 
the  mean  absolute  revision  of  the  preliminary  ad- 
justed  data,  espressed  il!  terms  of  annualized  growth 
rates,  is  on  the  order  of  13 percentage  points.‘“”  Two 
specific  cases  are  discussed  below. 
Enstcv  Week  Since  the  week  containing  the  Easter 
holiday  varies  from  year  to  year  over  an  al,prosi- 
mately  four  calendar  week  span,  the  timing  of  this 
seasonal  influence  on  the  unadjusted  weekly  M,  data 
L” See  Wood  [7],  especially  Table  II. 
Table  V 
RATIO  OF  WEEKLY  Ml  LEVEL TO  CENTERED 
FIVE-WEEK  AVERAGE  IN  WEEKS 
SURROUNDING  EASTER 
(Seasonally  Adjusted  Dote) 
Date  of 
Week  Week  Week  Week  Week  Easter 
1  2  3*  4  5  Sunday  ----__- 
1968  0.999  0.998  1.009  0.997  0.995  April  14 
1969  0.997  0.998  1.011  1.005  0,996  April  6 
1970  0.992  0.990  1.018  1.005  0.999  March  29 
1971  1.001  1.008  1.006  0.997  0.990  April  11 
1972  1.000  0.997  1.003  1.001  0.998  April  2 
1973  1  .ooo  1.003  0.994  1.001  1.000  April  22 
1974  1.001  1 .ooo  1.003  1.000  0.998  April  14 
1975  0.999  0.999  1.000  1.001  1.000  March  30 
1976  0.998  1.005  1.004  0.996  0.998  April  18 
1977  0.991  1.005  1.004  0.999  1.004  April  10 
* Includes  Easter  Sunday. 
Note:  Ratios  are  calculated  using  preliminary  data. 
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also  shifts.  The  weekly  seasonal  adjustment  pro- 
cedure  described  in  the  Box  makes  no  allowance  for 
these  shifts.“3  Consequently,  one  would  expect  that 
the  seasonal  adjustment  factor  for  the  week  con- 
taining  Easter  would  typically  be  too  small,  and, 
correspondingly,  the  reported  seasonally  adjusted  M, 
level  in  that  week  would  be  too  large.  The  data  in 
Table  V  tend  to  support  this  assertion.  Each  entry 
in  the  table  is  the  ratio  of the  seasonally  adjusted  M1 
level  for  the  indicated  week  to  a  five-week  average 
of  weekly  levels  centered  on  that  week.  Ratios  are 
reported  for  the  Easter  week  and  the  two  surround- 
ing  weeks  in  each  of  the  last  ten  years.  In  five  of  the 
years,  the  Easter  week  ratio  is  the  largest  of  the  five 
ratios.  It  is  the  second  largest  in  four  of  the  re- 
maining  five  years,  strongly  suggesting  a  systematic 
upward  bias  affecting  that  week. 
Cllangcs  in the  Intra~uonthly  Seasonal  The  second 
example  involves  the  effect  of  a  somewhat  more 
general  phenomenon  on  the  behavior  of  the  season- 
ally  adjusted  weekly  data:  namely  gradual  changes 
in  the  seasonal  behavior  of the  unadjusted  data  z&l&z 
a  calendar  month.  To  the  extent  such  change  does 
in  fact  occur,  it  would  tend  to  introduce  an  intra- 
“Since  the  week  containing  Easter  is  known  well  in  advance.  its 
seasonal  effect  on  the  weekly  Ml  data  could  presumably  be  antici- 
pated  throulrh  judgmental  adjustments  to  the  preliminary  seasonal 
adjustment  factors.  The  evidence  supxnarized  in  Table  V,  however. 
indicates  that  if  judgmental  adjustments  have  been  made.  they  have 
not  been  adequate. 
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monthly  seasonal  movement  into  the  preliminary  ad- 
justed  weekly  data  in  a  manner  analogous  to  the 
impact  of  the  Christmas  cycle  on  the  adjusted 
monthly  data.24 
There  is  ample  evidence  that  intramonthly  sea- 
sonal  patterns  change.  The  two  panels  of  Chart  7 
depict  the  intramonthly  pattern  of  the  not  seasonally 
adjusted  MI  data  during  four  separate  years  span- 
ning  a  16-year  period  for  the  months  of  July  and 
August.  These  months  were  selected  since  they  are 
less  influenced  than  other  months  by  tax  dates  and 
other  events  that  might  obscure  the  evolution.  While 
this  evolution  has  by  no  means  proceeded  at  a  steady 
pace,  a  careful  examination  of  both  panels  of  this 
chart  suggests  that  there  is  now  relatively  greater 
strength  in  the  data  during  the  first  half  of  the  month 
and  a  sharper  decline  during  the  second  half.  Com- 
w  Bee  Section  III,  pp.  8-9. 
parable  data  for  other  months  suggest  that  a  similar 
change  may  be  occurring  in  these  moriths.“5  While 
this  evolution  is  not  as  neat  and  persistent  as  the 
similar  gradual  change  in  the  Christmas  cycle  affect- 
ing  the  monthly  data,  it  does  appear  to  be  influencing 
the  behavior  of  the  adjusted  weekly  data.  Chart  8 
provides  evidence  supporting  this  contention.  The 
chart  shows  the  average  change  in  preliminary  sea- 
sonally  adjusted  Ml  for  statement  weeks  ending  on  a 
given  calendar  day  of  the  month  over  the  12  months 
of  1976,  smoothed  by  a  moving  average.  The  chart 
clearly  indicates  an  upward  bias  in  the  seasonall) 
adjusted  movement  of  Ml  in  the  first  half  of  the 
month  and  a  downward  bias  in  the  second  half  of  the 
month,  a  pattern  consistent  with  the  evolution  of  the 
SThe  cause  of  this  evolution  is  not  entirely  clear.  Systematic 
changes  in  the  intramonthly  pattern  of  Treasury  disbursements 
and  receipts,  however,  are  in  all  likelihood  an  important  eo‘otribut- 
ing  factor. 
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intramonthly  pattern  of  the  not  seasonally  adjusted 
data  illustrated  in  Chart  7. 
V. 
Conclusion 
This  article  has  attempted  to  identify  and  esplnin 
some  of  the  factors  that  produce  the  high  degree  of 
observed  variability  in  short-run  seasonally  adjusted 
Ml  growth  rates.  Sonic  of  this  varial)ility  undouht- 
edly  results  from  fundamental  changes  in  economic 
conditions  that  produce  changes  in  the  underlying 
demand  for  and  supply  of  n1,  balances.  A  large  part 
of  the  olzerved  variation,  however,  appears  to  have 
little  ‘ro do  with  economic  conditions,  and  it  is  with 
these  noneconomic  determinants  that  this  article  has 
lIeen  concerned.  In  particular.  the  article  has  argued 
that  many  short-run  swings  in  M,  growth  rates 
result  frolli  ( 1 )  special  events  that  occur  irregularly 
or  (2)  the  inability  of  existing  seasonal  adjustment 
procedures  to  capture  fully  the  impact  of  changes  in 
the  seasonal  behavior  of  Ml,  especially  when  such 
changes  are  actually  in  progress.  Specifically,  the 
discussion  has  indicated  that  the  observed  variation 
in  short-run  growth  rates  has  been  produced  by 
forces  as  broad  and  persistent  as  the  apparent  longer- 
run  change  in  the  seasonal  demand  for  M1  balances 
during  the  Christmas  season  and  the  abrupt  change 
in  the  level  of  Federal  income  tax  refunds  in  1973 
to  such  seemingly  innocuous  developments  as  the 
recent  change  in  the  timing  of monthly  social  security 
disbursements  and  year-to-year  variations  in  the  time 
required  to  process  tax  payments. 
Monetary  economists,  both  inside  and  outside  the 
Federal  Reserve,  frequently  point  out  that  too  much 
attention  is  paid  to  monthly  and  weekly  M,  growth 
rates.  Short-run  growth  rates  are  important,  how- 
ever,  because  the  Federal  Reserve’s  current  procedure 
for  implementing  monetary  policy  on  a  day-to-day 
basis  makes  them  important.  As  pointed  out  in  the 
introduction  to  this  article,  preliminary  estimates  of 
current  two-month  Ml  growth  rates  are  one  of  the 
major  factors  determining  policy  actions  under  exist- 
ing  operating  procedures. 
Federal  Reserve  policymakers  are  well  aware  of 
the  existence  of  short-run  disturbances  of  the  kind 
discussed  in  this  article.  The  problem  faced  by 
policymakers-and  by  financial  market  participants 
attempting  to  anticipate  Federal  Reserve  policy-is 
that  the  immediate  causes  of  short-run  M1  growth 
rate  variations  are  not  usually  apparent  on  a  current 
basis.  But  the  appropriate  policy  response  to  sucli 
movements  depends  critically  on  the  conditions  caus- 
ing  them.  Suppose,  for  esample,  that  M1  growth 
over  a two-month  period  exceeded  the  desired  longer- 
run  rate.  If  it  were  clear  that  this  divergence  re- 
flected  an  increase  in  the  demand  for  transactions 
1)alnnces  due  to  excessive  final  demand  for  goods 
and  services  in  the  economy  at  large,  policymakers 
woultl  know  that  the  acceleration  should  be  resisted. 
Conversely,  if  the  increase  were  obviously  the  result 
of  some  temporary  disturl~nnce  likely  to  wash  out  in 
the  near  future,  policymakers  would  presumably  pur- 
sue  ;I steady  policy  course.  The  principal  implication 
of  the  analysis  in  this  article  is  that  making  such 
determinations  on  a  current  basis  with  any  degree  of 
certainty  is  always  difficult  and  often  impossible.  As 
the  preceding  sections  have  attempted  to  demonstrate, 
a  wide  variety  of  factors  unrelated  to  basic  economic 
trends  can  and  do  affect  short-run  Ml  growth  rates, 
particularly  the  preliminary  growth  rates  that  actu- 
ally  determine  policy  actions. 
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this  problem-either  for  policyrnakers  or  market  ol)- 
servers-is  likely  to  be  forthcoming.  Under  these 
circumstances,  close  and  eclectic  analysis  of  each 
individual  fluctuation  in  short-run  growth  rates  ap- 
pears  to  be  the  most  promising  approach.  In  par- 
ticular,  the  analysis  presented  in  this  article  suggests 
that  a  detailed  familiarity  (1  )  with  seasonal  patterns 
in  the  not  seasonally  adjusted  M1  data  at  certain 
times  of  the  year  and  (2)  with  any  ongoing  or  pro- 
spective  changes  in  these  patterns  can  assist  in  evalu- 
ating  incoming  short-run  M1  data. 
Beyond  the  question  of  evaluating  incoming  data, 
however,  lies  the  more  fundamental  issue  of  appro- 
printe  tactical  procedures  for  implementing  monetary 
policy.  Any  detailed  analysis  of  this  issue  is  well 
lqontl  the  scope  of  this  article.  The  preceding  de- 
scription  of  the  difficulties  inherent  in  evaluating 
current  short-run  R/l1 data,  however,  is  bound  to  raise 
doul)ts  sl)out  the  effectiveness  of  any  operating  pro- 
cedure.  such  as  the  esisting  one,  that  focuses  largely 
on  nnnualized  short-run  growth  rates  without  relating 
these  short-run  growth  rates  to  desired  longer-run 
growth  in  n  very  systenlatic  fashion.  Suggestions 
for  improving  these  procedures  have  been  made  else- 
where.“G  It  would  appear  that  tllese  suggestions 
deserve  further  attention. 
20 See,  for  example, Poole [Sl. 
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